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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
S'rATE OF UTAH

GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION, a New York
Corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
HECTOR MARTINEZ and MANUEL M.
RIVERA,
Defendants-Appellants,

Case No. 18072

vs.
GREAT EQUITY LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS;
STREATOR CHEVROLET COMPANY,
INC.: AL BARRUTIA; BRENT H.
JENSEN; and E.C. ROSEBOROUGH,
Third-Party DefendantsRespondents.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff, General Motors Acceptance Corporation,
(hereinafter "GMAC") commenced an action in replevin against
Defendants, Hector Martinez and Manuel Rivera after default in
payments under a conditional sale contract.

Defendants brought

action against Third-Party Defendant Great Equity Life Insurance

-1-
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Company (hereinafter "Great Equity") to compel the insurance
carrier to make the payments under a disability policy purchased by
Defendant, Hector Martinez.

Great Equity denied the claim due to

a preexisting condition and corresponding exlusion in the policy.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the Court granted a
directed verdict in favor of GMAC and thereafter, allowed
attorney's fees of $2,500.00.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, GMAC, seeks an affirmation of the verdict and of
the award of attorney's fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 12, 1978, Hector Martinez and Manuel M. Rivera,
Defendants and Appellants contracted with Streator Chevrolet
Company Incorporated to purchase a 1977 Chevrolet Malibu.
Plaintiff's Exhibit "l".

See

At the time of executing the

conditional sale contract, Hector Martinez also arranged purchase
of a policy of life and disability insurance through Great Equity
Life Insurance Company of Chicago to pay off the balance of the
contract in the event of his subsequent death or disability.
Defendant's Exhibit "17", R-480.

See

The sales contract was then

assigned by Streator to Plaintiff-Respondent, General Motors
Acceptance Corporation for financing of the vehicle and insurance
premiums.

R-358, 368.
-2-
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Subsequent to the purchase of the vehicle, the Defendant,
Hector Martinez, made two payments on the contract, and
thereafter, according to the evidence, became disabled as a
consequence of a kidney failure.

{R. 456).

Hector Martinez then

made application through Streator Chevrolet and the insurance
carrier to make the payments because of a suffered disability.
Upon receipt of the notice of the claimed disability, GMAC
deferred collection efforts on its contract while the insurance
carrier, Great Equity Life, conducted an investigation to
determine whether the disability was within the terms of the
policy.

( R. 3 7 9 ).

In July, 1979, GMAC was advised by Great Equity that it was
denying coverage to Mr. Martinez.

See Defendant's Exhibit "23".

GMAC then notified Mr. Martinez of the denial and sought payment
from Defendants under the contract.
"15".

See Defendant's Exhibit

Upon failure of the payments, GMAC sought to recover

possession of its collateral.
GMAC attempted, on two occasions, to obtain summary judgment
to allow it recover the vehicle but the same was refused forcing
GMAC to go to tr i al.

( R • 6 8 , 6 9 ; R. 13 9 , 1 4 0 ) •

At the con c 1 us ion

of all the evidence and prior to submission of the matter to the
jury, Judge Dean Condor ruled in favor of General Motors
Acceptance Corporation, granting it judgment and allowed the
issues between Hector Martinez and Great Equity Life to go to the
jury.

(R. 525; R. 532),
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Because counsel for appellants persists in trying to suggest
that GMAC somehow has ties to Streator and Great Equity that make
GMAC responsible for the nonpayment of the insurance carrier,
counsel has felt obliged to set forth the policies and procedures
of GMAC generally and as applied to this contract and as
supported by the testimony of Plaintiff's agent, Morris Keetch,
who testified at trial, without contravention.

These policies

are reviewed with Plaintiff's agent, Morris Keetch, at pages 354
through 380 of the Record.
Plaintiff, General Motors Acceptance Corporation, as applied
to this case, is in the

bu~iness

of purchasing retail installment

sale contracts from automobile dealers upon sales of motor
vehicles to customers. Although GMAC negotiates arrangements
with automobile dealets for acquiring retail installment sale
contracts, no dealer is under any obligation to utilize the
services of GMAC.

Likewise, GMAC will provide forms and

advertising literature to the dealer but such forms need not be
used by the dealer except when the dealer intends to use GMAC for
financing.
No dealer, doing business with GMAC, nor any customer of
any dealer is under any obligation to submit any contract to
GMAC and the dealer and customer are at liberty to work out any
financing arrangements agreeable between them.

The customer is

entitled to utilize a bank or any other financing institution
and the dealer is authorized to recommend or use any source of
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financing,

including the carrying of the contract on his own, if

desired.
GMAC does not require as a prerequisite to accepting a
contract for financing that a customer arrange for credit life
or disability insurance.
with the customer.

Such arrangement is strictly optional

Also, GMAC does not select the insurance

carrier for the customer, if insurance is selected, nor does it
obtain any compensation from the premiums paid, except incidentally by interest charges upon the amount of premium which
may be financed under the contract.

The financing institution,

in this case GMAC, would be named the beneficiary under the
contract in the event the life or disability portion of the
contract should be called into effect.

GMAC would then be paid

its monthly payments during the period. of disability, or in the
event of loss of life, the balance on the contract.
Upon receipt of a contract by a dealer for acceptance by
GMAC, Plaintiff, in its course of business, checks the same for
sufficiency of information, accuracy of computation, and
compliance with local law.

At the presentation of the contract

to GMAC, GMAC reserves the right to accept or reject the same
and has no obligation to assume the contract forwarded by the
dealer.
At no time does GMAC become involved in the negotiations
of the price or other arrangements on the contract nor does it
dictate the terms thereof to the dealer or customer.

The dealer
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and customer are left free to arrange price and other benefits
under the contract.

GMAC has neither personal contact with the

customer nor an opportunity to communicate with the customer
and must necessarily rely upon the information forwarded at the
time of the proposed assignment of the contract by the automobile dealer.

Specifically, in the instant case, GMAC did not

deal with the Defendants, either personally, directly, or
indirectly.
When Defendants arranged for the purchase of the
automobile in question, a 1977 Chevrolet Malibu Classic, their
dealings were strictly with Streator Chevrolet.

(R. 476-480).

The election of Defendant Hector Martinez to acquire a
disability insurance contract, was a determination which he was
entirely free to accept or reject.

(R. 367, 368).

Upon receipt of the contract, GMAC approved the same for
financing and forwarded the requisite balance to the dealer
including funds to finance the insurance premium for disability
insurance.
Equity Life.

However, GMAC is in no way affiliated with Great
(R. 357).

This matter was left between the selling

dealer and the customer.
At the conclusion of Plaintiff's case, Plaintiff's counsel
requested leave of Court to give evidence relative to attorneys
fees following a final decision of the merits by the Court or
jury, it being the position of counsel for Plaintiff that the
attorneys fees were a matter to be determined by the Court and
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not the jury.
thereto.

( R. 336; 34 4 ). Counsel for Defendants objected

(R. 342).

After the decision of the jury, Counsel for Plaintiff made
a motion for entry of judgment and for a determination of
attorneys fees.

(R. 336).

This matter was scheduled for hearing

but was continued at the request of Counsel for Defendants to the
2nd of December, 1981.

(R. 338).

On December 2nd, Counsel for

Plaintiff appeared at the hearing, after having previously
submitted an affidavit for attorneys fees and was prepared, if
necessary, to give testimony at that time.

Counsel for

Defendants did not appear at the. hearing and after reviewing the
matter, Judge Condor executed judgment in favor of the Plaintiff
and, based on the affidavit supplied, (R. 340) awarded an
attorneys fee of $2,500.00.

(R. 539, 540).

The only issues raised by Defendants which appear to
challenge the judgment rendered in favor of GMAC are parts four
and six of Defendants' Brief.

Therefore, Plaintiff responds

only to these issues, and to the facts as construed by
Defendants' Counsel.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHETHER A PURCHASER OF A MOTOR VEHICLE UNDER A CONDITIONAL
SALE CONTRACT, WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE FINANCING OF A PREMIUM OF
A DISABILITY INSURANCE POLICY BY THE FINANCING INSTITUTION IS
ENTITLED TO WITHHOLD PAYMENTS ON THE CONTRACT TO THE FINANCING
INSTITUTION WHEN THE DISABILITY CARRIER DISPUTES THE RIGHT OF
THE DISABLED PURCHASER TO CLAIM THE BENEFITS OF THE POLICY.
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Counsel for Defendants suggests that GMAC, by virtue of
its accepting the contract of sale between Defendants and
Streator Chevrolet for financing, caused GMAC to stand in the
shoes of Great Equity Life.

Therefore, it is alleged that GMAC

was obligated to be paid by Great Equity Life or forfeit payments due under the contract.

This theory of Counsel for

Defendants is apparently predicated upon the fact that GMAC
stood to benefit both under the sales contract and under the
policy issued by Great Equity Life.

However, no authority to

support such a proposition is cited by Counsel.
It is clear from the evidence and as found by the lower
Court, that GMAC received by assignment a conditional sale
contract from Streator Chevrolet, which it accepted for financing.

(R. 524).

Also it is undisputed that at the receipt of

the contract by GMAC the contract, on its face, indicated that
Defendant Hector Martinez requested disability insurance and
that the same was to be financed out of the proceeds to be paid
by GMAC to Streator Chevrolet.
(R. 369).

See Plaintiff's Exhibit "l":

Also, the contract is specifically clear that Defendants,

not Great Equity Life, were to pay the contract.
The evidence did adduce that the purpose of the disability
policy was to pay the obligation of Defendant, if Hector
Martinez became disabled within the stipulated provisions of the
insurance contract, and that Great Equity Life recognized the
obligation to pay GMAC, the creditor.

See Defendant's Exhibit
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"22".

However, this was not a part of the sales contract.
Under the law of this state and established rules of

contract, all provisions of an agreement should be considered
and given effect [Minshew v. Chevron Oil Company, 575 P.2d
(

192 (Utah 1978)], and when the language is clear, it must
be enforced according to its terms.

Wingets v. Bitters,

28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P. 2d 1007 (1972).

A court will not

rewrite the terms of an unambiguous contract [Provo City Cory.
v. Nielson

Sco~t

Company, Inc., 603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979)],

and a contract does not become ambiguous (so as to cause a court
to rewrite it) by the fact that the parties may urge diverse
interpretations.

Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980).

Also, when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, the
contract is conclusive.

Rushing v.

Lov~lace-Bataan

Health

Program, 598 P.2d 211 (New Mex. 1979).
As concerns a question of rights of a party, not a party
to a contract, but for whose benefit the contract was made,
it is well settled, that the rights of the third person to sue
under the contract are dependent upon the terms of the agreement
and are no greater than those of the promisee.

Continental Bank

and Trust Company v. Stewart 1 4 Utah 2d 228, 291 P. 2d 890, 894
(1955).
A reading of the contract of sale in the instant case
clearly establishes the obligation of Defendants to pay on the
contract.

Nowhere does the agreement specify the right of the
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Defendant to withhold payment if the buyer became disabled
or, upon becoming disabled, if the insurance carrier refused to
pay.

Further, the contract does not give the right to the buyer

to withhold payment if he disagrees with the refusal of the
insurance carrier to pay under its contract.
The contract of insurance was between Hector Martinez and
Great Equity Life Insurance Company.

GMAC, although a

beneficiary, was not a party to the contract.

Consequently,

when a dispute arose as to whether Hector Martinez was within
the coverage provisions of the policy, that dispute was for him
to resolve, and if possible, to force the insurance carrier to
perform its contract.

The fact GMAC may have had an interest

and claim as a third party beneficiary did not suddenly
terminate the sales agreement.

The rights of GMAC as a third

party beneficiary would be no greater than those of Hector
Martinez.

Continantal

BaE~

&

Trus~

Co. v. Stewart, supra.

However, even assuming the right of GMAC to sue Great Equity
Life as a third party beneficiary, GMAC could do nothing more
than seek to compel Great Equity Life to pay the payments;
however, it was not obligated to do so.
To suggest that GMAC, by financing the premium for a
disability policy on behalf of Hector Martinez, forfeited its
rights to look to the Defendant for payment while Hector
Martinez pursued his claim against Great Equity Life, would
require a rewriting of a clear and unequivocal contract, which
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the courts will not do.
Company, Inc., supra.

Provo City Cor_p. v. Nielson Scott
To uphold the position sought by

Defendants would afford every person who causes injury to
another for which he carries insurance, to prevent judgment
being entered against himself merely because a dispute arises
between himself and his insurance carrier as to whether the incident
was covered under the policy.
The proper remedy for Defendants would have been to make
the payments under the agreement with GMAC and prosecute against
Great Equity Life to recover such sums as Defendants could
establish the carrier was liable to pay.

See Scott v.

M~tropolita~ Life, 398 P.2d 822 (Okl. 1964).
By failing to perform under the sales contract, Defendants
breached the agreement entitling Plaintiff to judgment.

The

lower Court properly granted judgment in favor of the Plaintiff
and the decision of the lower Court should be upheld.
POINT II
WHETHER A PARTY TO A CONTRACT AUTHORIZING RECOVERY OF
ATTORNEYS FEES WAIVES THE RIGHT TO OBTAIN SUCH FEES BY FAILING
TO PRESENT EVIDENCE THEREOF BEFORE THE JURY BUT THEREAFTER
PRESENTS EVIDENCE TO THE COURT.
Under our law, attorneys fees are awardable only if
expressly provided by contract or statute and then only if there
is produced to the Court evidence of the necessity and
reasonableness of the fee awarded.
1273 (Utah 1976).

Walker v. ?andwick, 548 P.2d

There is no question that the sales contract
-11-
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in issue did provide for attorneys fees if an attorney was
utilized to enforce collection of the contract.

See Plaintiff's

Exhibit "l", reverse side, Paragraph 4.
The establishment of a reasonable attorneys fee in a
contested matter is not controlled by any set formula [Wallace
v. Build, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 401, 402 P.2d 699 {1965)] and the
same may be established by stipulation, an unrebutted affidavit
or evidence given as to the value thereof.

Freed Finance Company

v. Stoker Motor Company, 537 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1975).

Regardless

of how the fee is proved, it is clear that the fee must be
supported by evidence in the record.

See Richards v. Hodson, 26

Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044 (1971).
Counsel for Defendants suggests two propositions as to why
attorneys fees should not be granted:

first, he indicates there

is no evidence in the record, and second, that no evidence was
presented to the jury.
As to the first proposition, the record evidences that
after the Court· directed a verdict in favor of Plaintiff,
Counsel sought for a hearing to establish his claim for
attorneys fees and for entry of judgment based upon the of
Court's granting of Plaintiff's motion for directed verdict at
trial.

(R.

336~

The motion was initially scheduled for November

23, 1981, and was rescheduled to be heard on December 2, 1981,
at the request of Counsel for Defendants (R. 338) who, after
receiving notice of the hearing and a copy of Counsel's

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Affidavit for attorneys fees, neither attended the hearing nor
opposed the reasonableness of the fees in the Affidavit.
(R. 540).

Counsel did forward his motion requesting a denial of

the attorneys fees because of failure to produce evidence before
the jury but did not challenge the reasonableness of the fees.
(R. 342).

Consequently, the Court properly awarded attorneys fees

after the trial based on proper evidence, and an unrebutted
affidavit.

(R. 536-538; R. 539);

Stoker Motor Company,

See

Fr~ed

Finance Company v.

sup~.

The second question· raised is whether failure of Counsel
to provide testimony before the jury for its consideration
precludes the subsequent entry of the award.

It is true that

attorneys fees must be proved as other damages, that is, by
stipulation or evidence,

[Cluff v. Culmer, 556 P.2d 498 (Utah

1976)) but the question is, to whom must the reasonableness of
the fee be proved?

This Court has long held that the judiciary

has the power to determine what is a reasonable attorneys fee
when a claim therefor is properly in issue by contract or by
statute.

Thatcher v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 568, 207

P.2d 178 (1949).
402 P.2d 699, 701,

Further, as stated in Wallace v. Build, Inc.,
(1965):

What is reasonable depends upon a number of
factors, the amount in controversy, the extent
of services rendered and other factors which
the trial court is in an advantaged position
to judge.
Emphasis added.
In F.M.A. Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah
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2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965), the Court recognized that an
award of attorneys fees need be supported by some evidence
to the judge, stating at page 673 of 404 P.2d:
Because both judges and lawyers have special
knowledge as to the value of legal services,
this (proof of fees) is not always required
to be proved by sworn testimony.
It is
sometimes submitted upon stipulation as to
the amount; or that the judge may fix it
on the basis of his own knowledge and
experience; and/or in connection with reference to a bar approved schedule.
Emphasis
added~ matter in parenthesis and underlining
by author.
From the authorities cited, it is evident that the
reasonableness of an attorneys fee is a matter for court
determination.

The reasonableness of this position affords the

trial judge, himself an experienced lawyer, the opportunity of
determining what is reasonable in a given case.

Laymen jurors,

unfamiliar with the demands and efforts of counsel, would not
be in a position to identify what is reasonable in a given case.
Producing such evidence would be a waste of the jurors' time.
Further, if evidence concerning reasonableness of attorneys fees
is produced before the jury, this puts counsel in the awkward
situation not only of having to argue the cause of his client on
its merits but to justify before the jury his charges for his
services, thus requiring counsel to, "have a fool for a client".
A reading of the case of Gardner v. Christiansen, 622 P.2d
782 (Utah 1980), might cause one to conclude that an award of
attorneys fees must be based upon evidence produced in the case
-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Correction to Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant
General Motors Acceptance Corporation

GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HECTOR MARTINEZ and
MANUEL M. RIVERA,

CASE NO.

18072

Defendants,
vs.
GREAT EQUITr LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, et. al.
Correction to Page 15 of Brief of General Motors Acceptance Corporation: The last sentence of the carry-over paragraph starting at
line 10 and e~ding at line 14 should read:
In fact, in Provo City Corp. v. Cropper,
28 Utah 2d 1, 497 P2d 629 ( 1972) ,. the Supreme Court remanded
the case to the District Court for the purpose of taking
evidence on the issue of attorney's fees, when such evidence
was omitted in the proceedings below.
Respectfully submitted,

v-:

(

Barney
-tor y for Plainti -Appellant,
eral Motors Acceptance
Corporation.
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in chief and not after.

Here, Counsel, after resting his case

and prior to closing argument, moved to reopen, in a hearing
before the judge, to produce evidence of attorneys fees, which
was denied by the Court.

On appeal, the Court although

recognizing that a motion to reopen for additional evidence is
within the sound discretion of the Court, nevertheless ruled the
trial Court abused its discretion in failing to allow counsel to
present the requested evidence.

The case does not stand for the

position that evidence of attorney's fees must be made prior to
resting one's case.

In fact,

in Provo City Corp. v. Cropper,

28 Utah 2d 1, 497 P.2d 629 (1972), the Supreme Court remanded
the case to the District Court for the purpose of taking
evidence on the issue of attorney's fees, when such evidence was
omitted at trial.
Even assuming that the jury was the proper forum to have
heard the evidence relative to attorneys fees, failure of
counsel to present evidence to the jury would not be fatal to
the award rendered by the Court in the instant case.

Then, the

Court directed a verdict for Plaintiff at the close of all the
evidence, the Court took all issues relating to Plaintiff's case
from the jury.

Therefore, it also had the discretion to receive

such further evidence in the case as it deemed pertinent.

See

Gardner v. Christiansen, supra.
In the exercise of its discretion, the lower Court granted
Counsel for Plaintiff, after notice to Defendants' Counsel, an
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opportunity to present its claim for attorneys fees and accepted
the affidavit as presented.

Such discretion in proceeding was

not prejudicial to the rights of Defendant (See Gardner v.
Christiansen, supra at 784), especially where the affidavit of
Plaintiff's Counsel as to the reasonableness of the fees was
unopposed.

See Freed Finance Company v. Stoker Motor Co@pany,

supra.
For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the lower
Court awarding attorneys fees should be upheld.
POINT III
CERTAIN ALLEGATIONS OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT IN HIS
STATEMENT OF FACTS ARE MISLEADING AND CONFUSING
Counsel for Plaintiff begs the indulgence of the Court
to one further point.

Because of time limitations on oral

argument when granted, counsel felt it important to call to the
Court's attention certain matters that have been stated by
counsel for Defendant that tend to be misleading and confusing.
At page 2 of the Statement of Facts of Defendant's
brief, Defendant alleges:
The Conditional Sales Contract did provide that
should Hector Martinez die or become totally
disabled, the Great Equity Life Insurance Company
of Chicago, Illinois would pay off the contract
in its entirety.
The Conditional Sale Contract in this case made no
such provision that would have any effect upon Hector Martinez.
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The Contract, on its face, had a provision that suggests that
the Prudential Insurance Company of America, Newark, New Jersey,
by virtue of group policy #GL360, could issue life and
disability insurance.

However, to accept this particular

policy, the Buyer was required to sign in the box related to
this item.

Hector Martinez neither signed nor agreed to a

policy with Prudential, but rather elected a policy provided
through the agent of Streator Chevrolet with Great Equity Life.
Consequently, counsel's reference to this portion of the
Conditional Sale Contract is misleading and has nothing to do
with the terms and conditions of the disability policy issued by
Great Equity Life.
Additionally, at page 9, counsel for Defendant suggests
that Streator Chevrolet was required to take an age and health
statement from Mr. Martinez according to the provisions on the
face of the Contract relating to the Prudential Insurance
Company information.

Again, as previously indicated, this

provision had no relevance to the contract as this company was
not utilized.

See also Brief of Third-Party Defendants-

Respondents at Pages 17-19.
At page 27 of counsel's brief, it is suggested that Mre
Rex Elton was empowered by GMAC to write insurance for Great
Equity.

At no place in the testimony given before the trial Court·

was there any evidence whatsoever indicating GMAC empowered Mr.
Elton to do anything, including the writing of insurance.
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Specifically, see pages 370, 371 of the Record.
At page 28, counsel suggests that GMAC undertook to
interpret the policy of insurance.
misstatement of the facts.

Again, this is a

It is acknowledged that a letter was

forwarded to Mr. Martinez after GMAC received notice from Great
Equity Life that it was denying coverage based on a preexisting
condition.

Upon sending a letter to Mr. Martinez requesting

additional payment, the author of the letter, apparently being
confused about the policy, adopted language from the Prudential
Insurance Company information contained on the Conditional Sales
Contract as the basis for the denial. See Defendant's Exhibit
"15".

Although the provision cited was in error, and unrelated

to this contract as previously explained, the factual position
was still accurate based upon the representations of Great
Equity Life, namely that Great Equity Life was denying coverage
under the policy to Mr. Martinez because of a pre-existing
condition which the insurance carrier asserted should have been
known to Mr. Martinez.

See Plaintiff's Exhibit "12".

GMAC's

letter, regardless of the reasons for denial by the insurance
carrier, was to inform Mr. Martinez of his obligation to bring
his payments current and fulfill his contract.

The decision not

to pay the disability was that of Great Equity Life and not that
of General Motors Acceptance Corporation.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons as set forth in Plaintiff's Brief,
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judgment of the lower Court in favor of Plaintiff and against
Defendants should be upheld and further, the attorneys fees of
$2,500.00 as established to the satisfaction of the Court should
be awarded.
Respectfully submitted,

JAY V. BARNEY,
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent,
General Motors Acceptance Corporation
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
This is to certify that

on.the~~-

day of February,

1982, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION was
given to The Runner Service to be delivered to the following:
Mr. Mark S. Miner
525 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
Attorneys for DefendantsAppellants, Hector Martinez
and Manuel M. Rivera
Mr. William J. Hansen
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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Attorneys for Third-Patty
Defendant-Respondent Great
Equity Life Insurance Company
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